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In A Theory of Justice and elsewhere John Rawls writes that the basic 
structure of any society affects the life prospects of those growing up 
in different ‘starting places,’ yet his conception of equal opportunity 
seems to require that one’s opportunities not be affected by the class 
position of one’s birth.1 Here I explicate this apparent contradiction 
and reconcile these assertions. In Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity 
children from working-class families have lesser opportunity to attain 
advantaged positions.
Rawls’s view cannot be easily revised to allow equal prospects for 
all children. Within the framework of Rawls’s understanding of a just 
society, he is right to say that his own conception of fair equality of 
opportunity allows deep inequalities in life prospects.
Nevertheless, Rawls’s vision of a just society rests on some dubious 
sociology. Moreover, Rawls’s assumed division of labor — between 
highly trained and less skilled labor — unjustly blunts the development 
 1 The primary texts cited will be A Theory of Justice revised edition (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press 1999), hereafter cited as Theory with page numbers in text, 
and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Erin Kelly, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press 2001), usually cited as Restatement with page numbers in text.
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of ability in many children. Equal opportunity for all children regard-
less of class of origin would require abolition of that division of labor.
I  Rawlsian Fair Equality of Opportunity and
 the Basic Structure
Rawls’s conception of equal opportunity seems to imply abolishing 
advantages associated with class position. In his late Justice as Fairness: 
A Restatement he writes
…fair equality of opportunity is said to require not merely that public offi ces and 
social positions be open in the formal sense, but that all should have a fair chance 
to attain them. To specify the idea of fair chance we say: supposing that there is a 
distribution of native endowments, those who have the same level of talent and 
ability and the same willingness to use these gifts should have the same prospects 
of success regardless of their social class of origin, the class into which they are 
born and develop until the age of reason. In all parts of society there are to be 
roughly the same prospects of culture and achievement for those similarly moti-
vated and endowed. (43-4)
In §12 of Theory he criticizes not only ‘the system of natural liberty’ 
but also the ‘liberal conception’ of the second principle of justice. (The 
liberal conception would advance fair equality of opportunity but 
would distribute wealth and income according to market rewards for 
ability.) He writes that ‘the principle of fair opportunity can only be 
imperfectly carried out’ in the liberal conception. The development of 
natural ability ‘is affected by all kinds of social conditions and class atti-
tudes.’ As a result, ‘it is impossible in practice to secure equal chances 
of achievement and culture for those similarly endowed’ (Theory, 64). 
These inequalities, apparently, would be not be present on the demo-
cratic conception, where distribution would be based on the difference 
principle.2
Rawls defends two principles of justice as ordering relations among 
people in a system of social cooperation. The fi rst is ‘a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the 
same scheme of liberties for all.’ The second principle of justice allows 
social and economic inequalities provided that those inequalities meet 
two conditions: there must be fair equality of opportunity to attain 
the more advantaged positions and inequalities must benefi t the least 
 2 I argue shortly that this is a misinterpretation, and that Rawls does not believe that 
these inequalities disappear on the democratic conception of justice, but that they 
achieve a specifi c social purpose on that conception.
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advantaged members of society, the second condition being called ‘the 
difference principle’ (for the principles of justice see Restatement, 42-3; 
cf. Theory, 266-7).
When, in Theory, Rawls introduces the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity, he explains it in words similar to those in Restatement, as 
follows: ‘assuming that there is a distribution of natural assets, those 
who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same will-
ingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regard-
less of their initial place in the social system. In all sectors of society 
there should be roughly equal prospects of culture and achievement for 
everyone similarly motivated and endowed. The expectations of those 
with the same abilities and aspirations should not be affected by their 
social class’ (§12 at 63). Superfi cially this seems to mean that in any 
society where there is fair equality of opportunity, social class of origin 
will simply make no difference to a child’s life prospects.
Yet there are passages where Rawls writes that class of origin affects 
life prospects. In Theory he explains the basic structure of a society as 
follows:
…this structure contains various social positions and…men born into different 
positions have different expectations of life determined, in part, by the political 
system as well as by economic and social circumstances. In this way the institu-
tions of society favor certain starting places over others. These are especially deep 
inequalities. Not only are they pervasive, but they affect men’s initial chances in 
life…. It is these inequalities, presumably inevitable in the basic structure of any 
society, to which the principles of social justice must in the fi rst instance apply. (7)
‘Deep inequalities…affect[ing] men’s initial chances in life’ are inevita-
bly part of any society.
In Restatement Rawls reiterates that the class position of the family in 
which we grow up affects our life prospects. Here he explains the basic 
structure as follows:
Justice as fairness focuses on inequalities in citizens’ life-prospects — their pros-
pects over a complete life… — as these prospects are affected by three contingen-
cies:
(a) their social class of origin: the class into which they are born and develop 
before the age of reason;
(b) their native endowments…; and their opportunities to develop these endow-
ments as affected by their social class of origin;
(c) their good or ill fortune, or good or bad luck… (…illness and accident…in-
voluntary unemployment…).
Even in a well-ordered society, then, our prospects over life are deeply affected by 
social, natural, and fortuitous contingencies, and by the way the basic structure, by 
setting up inequalities, uses those contingencies to meet certain social purposes. 
(55)
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Within a few pages Rawls writes that ‘there is some tendency for 
individuals most adversely affected by the three contingencies…to be 
among the least advantaged’ (65). Hence with ‘fair equality of oppor-
tunity’ social class of origin can adversely affect our life prospects, 
especially opportunities to develop our ‘endowments.’ In Restatement 
he writes, ‘when [the difference principle] is met, those with lesser 
opportunity can accept more easily the constraints the family and other 
social conditions impose’ (163, emphasis added; cf. Theory 448 and note 
6 below). For Rawls the basic structure, even a just one, creates unequal 
life prospects for children growing up in different social classes.
How is ‘lesser opportunity’ for children growing up in a less advan-
taged class compatible with ‘fair equality of opportunity?’ Explicating 
the difference principle in a 1967 paper, ‘Distributive Justice,’ Rawls 
writes
the inheritance of greater wealth is just as long as it is to the advantage of the worst 
off and consistent with liberty, including equality of opportunity. Now by the lat-
ter we do not mean, of course, the equality of expectations between classes, since 
differences in life-prospects arising from the basic structure are inevitable, and it 
is precisely the aim of the second principle to say when these differences are just. 
Instead, equality of opportunity is a set of institutions which assures equally good 
education and chances of culture for all and which keeps open the competition for 
positions on the basis of qualities reasonably related to performance, and so on. 
It is these institutions which are put in jeopardy when inequalities and concentra-
tions of wealth reach a certain limit.3
Here Rawls gives an interpretation of equal opportunity that makes 
it consistent with his statement that ‘differences in life-prospects aris-
 3 John Rawls, Collected Papers, Samuel Freeman, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press 1999), 130-53 at 143. A similar passage is in Theory §43, 245-6. In Theory 
the phrase ‘equally good education and chances of culture for all’ is replaced by 
‘similar chances of education and culture for persons similarly motivated.’ The 
insertion of the proviso about motivation is quite important, as we will see shortly. 
In Theory the thought contained in the sentence ‘Now by the latter we do not mean, 
of course, the equality of expectations between classes, since differences in life-
prospects arising from the basic structure are inevitable…’ is omitted. Why did 
he omit this sentence in Theory? The interpretation offered here is that he did not 
change his mind. Still, the juxtaposition of these two thoughts probably bothered 
him. I believe that he did not work through, as I will do here, the reconciliation of 
his ideas about equal opportunity with his ideas about the basic structure creating 
differences in life expectations. He may have been uncomfortable with juxtaposing 
the thoughts that the basic structure creates unequal life prospects and that justice 
requires that social class not affect the life prospects of those similarly endowed 
and motivated.
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ing from the basic structure are inevitable.’ This passage fl eshes out the 
meaning of Rawls’s assertion in Restatement that ‘the basic structure, 
by setting up inequalities, uses those contingencies to meet certain social 
purposes’ (55, emphasis added). For Rawls social class of origin may 
entail differences in life prospects as long as those inequalities advance 
the prospects — including opportunities — of the least advantaged.
In Theory he writes that in order to justify unequal opportunity one 
must ‘claim that the attempt to eliminate these inequalities [of oppor-
tunity] would so interfere with the social system and the operations of 
the economy that in the long run anyway the opportunities of the dis-
advantaged would be even more limited. The priority of fair opportu-
nity…means that we must appeal to the chances given to those with the 
lesser opportunity. We must hold that a wider range of more desirable 
alternatives is open to them than otherwise would be the case’ (265). He 
summarizes, ‘an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportu-
nities of those with the lesser opportunity’ (266). So this must be true of 
the differences in life prospects entailed by the basic structure.
Still, Rawls’s writings seem inconsistent. How can he reconcile chil-
dren having ‘the same prospects for culture and achievement’ with 
some having their life prospects adversely affected by social class of ori-
gin? And what about the passage in §46 of Theory where Rawls writes 
that the second principle ‘requires equal life prospects in all sectors of 
society’ (265) and passages cited earlier saying the same? The answer is 
that whenever Rawls writes about equality of life prospects as required 
by fair equality of opportunity, he writes that it ‘requires equal life pros-
pects in all sectors of society for those similarly endowed and motivated’ 
(265 emphasis added; see the ‘Distributive Justice’ passage above for 
the exception and note 3 for discussion). Suppose that Rawls believes 
that class of origin inevitably tends to affect motivation. Then his belief 
that we should have equal life prospects in all sectors for those equally 
endowed and motivated would be consistent with his belief that class 
differences inevitably affect initial chances in life.
When Rawls explains the difference principle he writes of ‘social con-
tingencies’ that favor some over others just as ‘native endowments’ do. 
He writes, ‘That we deserve the superior character that enables us to 
make the effort to cultivate our abilities is also problematic; for such 
character depends in good part upon fortunate family and social cir-
cumstances in early life for which we can claim no credit’ (Theory, 89). 
If ‘social circumstances’ include class, then he may believe that class of 
origin affects motivation.
To understand this better, let us return to the §12 passage in Theory 
briefl y discussed earlier; there he criticizes the liberal conception of the 
second principle of justice. This passage shows that he believes there is 
a connection between a person’s class of origin and motivation. Let us 
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take a more detailed look at these words, but with emphasis added. In 
the liberal conception of the second principle of justice
the principle of fair opportunity can be only imperfectly carried out, at least as long 
as some form of family exists. The extent to which natural capacities develop and 
reach fruition is affected by all kinds of social conditions and class attitudes. Even the 
willingness to make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense 
is itself dependent upon happy family and social circumstances. It is impossible in 
practice to secure equal chances of achievement and culture for those similarly 
endowed, and therefore we may want to adopt a principle that recognizes this fact 
and also mitigates the arbitrary effects of the natural lottery itself. That the liberal 
conception fails to do this encourages one to look for another interpretation of the 
two principles of justice. (64)
What leads us to look for another interpretation? One might think that 
the reason is that the liberal conception fails to create equal opportunity 
for children growing up in different classes. But the passage does not 
say that this is why we need another interpretation. The liberal concep-
tion is unsatisfactory because it fails to recognize a fact and to mitigate 
the effects of the natural lottery. The alleged ‘fact’ is that it is impossible 
to secure equal chances of achievement and culture for those similarly 
endowed (not those similarly motivated). Why is this impossible? The 
explanation seems to be that social conditions and class attitudes affect 
motivation and hence the realization of one’s ‘native endowment.’ This 
is true for two reasons. One, stressed in §77 of Theory, is that families in 
the same social sector may advantage their children unequally. The sec-
ond, suggested here in §12, is that the class position of families affects 
motivation and hence opportunity to develop ‘endowments’ (see also 
Restatement 55, subparagraph (b) quoted earlier).
Now we can understand why Rawls writes in Theory that ‘the institu-
tions of society favor some starting places over others,’ creating ‘deep’ 
and ‘pervasive’ inequalities that ‘affect men’s initial chances in life’ (7). 
Rawls believes that one’s ‘starting place’ affects the motivation one is 
likely to develop to exercise one’s ‘native endowments.’ On this view 
fair equality of opportunity for all people who are ‘similarly endowed 
and motivated’ does not imply equal life prospects for children grow-
ing up in more advantaged and less advantaged families.
The phrase ‘recognize this fact’ in §12 of Theory implies that a differ-
ent conception of justice will not alter the fact. In a society governed by 
Rawls’s democratic conception of justice the natural and social lotteries 
still create inequalities; class attitudes and social conditions still affect 
willingness to make an effort. The justifi cation of inequality is different; 
the democratic conception requires that inequalities in life prospects, 
unequal opportunity, be used to advance the prospects, including the 
opportunity, of those least advantaged. These are the ‘certain social 
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purposes’ that the basic structure meets by ‘setting up inequalities’ 
(Restatement 55).4
To recapitulate: Class background affects motivation to develop tal-
ents; children from advantaged families are more motivated and hence 
have a class-based advantage in the competition to determine who holds 
the more advantaged positions.5 Advantage tends to be somewhat self-
perpetuating. For Rawls this advantage is just when the advantages of 
the social lottery of class of origin as well as those of the natural lottery 
of talents benefi t those less advantaged.6
Rawls believed that opportunity for children from different class 
positions is unequal because children from lower class positions are 
less motivated to develop their abilities. But why would ‘a wider range 
of desirable alternatives [be] open to [those with lesser opportunity] 
than would otherwise be the case’ (Theory 265)?
Rawls seems to assume that where people have more material goods, 
they have more opportunity. He writes that ‘those who start out as mem-
bers of the entrepreneurial class in property-owning democracy, say, 
have a better prospect than those who begin in the class of unskilled 
 4 Why does Rawls object to the liberal conception that ‘the principle of fair oppor-
tunity can only be imperfectly carried out’? On both interpretations inequalities 
in life prospects arise from one’s class position. But for Rawls, fair opportunity 
requires that inequalities in opportunity advance the opportunities of those with 
least opportunity. The liberal conception does not guarantee that, and that is why, 
on the liberal conception, the principle of fair equality of opportunity cannot be 
perfectly carried out.
 5 Did Rawls also believe that class position affected one’s ‘native endowments’? 
This much is clear. He thought that in a just society those who held positions of 
advantage tended to be those who had greater scarce ‘native endowments’; the 
passage at Restatement 65 quoted above implies that he thought that those ‘least 
endowed’ were disproportionately represented among the least advantaged. Did 
he believe that people inherited greater and lesser ‘endowments’ from their par-
ents? The eugenic passage at Theory 92 suggests that he thought something like 
this; at 245 he speaks of the ‘unequal inheritance of intelligence’ as though it were 
an established fact. Although his use of the phrase ‘natural lottery’ may be thought 
to suggest that ‘endowments’ are random, the randomness he intends is ‘morally 
random’ or undeserved rather than ‘naturally random.’ Still, even if present, the 
belief that ‘endowments’ are affected by class position is a very secondary theme 
in Rawls. 
 6 In Theory §77 at 448, considering how family circumstances affect life chances for 
different individuals, Rawls writes that those of us who are disadvantaged by nat-
ural and social contingencies ‘are more ready to dwell on our good fortune now 
that these differences [in natural and social advantages] are made to work to our 
advantage, rather than be downcast by how much better off we might have been 
had we had an equal chance along with others if only all social barriers had been 
removed.’
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laborers.’ He writes that this ‘initial inequality in life prospects’ is ‘jus-
tifi able only if the difference in expectation is to the advantage of the 
representative man who is worse off, in this case the representative 
unskilled worker.’ The advantage of the entrepreneur (and of those 
born into the entrepreneurial class) must ‘raise the prospects of labor-
ing class [sic]’ and make ‘the economic process...more effi cient, innova-
tion proceed[ing] at a faster pace, and so on’ (Theory 67-8).7 Does this 
improve the worker’s opportunity? Rawls has argued that more goods 
will be produced (and presumably distributed to the worker). If oppor-
tunity is opportunity to obtain more goods, then the worker has greater 
opportunity.
Identifying opportunity with having more things is problematic 
for two reasons. First, consider positional goods, those that affect our 
standing relative to others.8 Can more things for those least advantaged 
raise them positionally? No, because having more things elevates their 
relative position only if it raises them above others, and, by defi nition, 
more things for the least advantaged does not do this. Second, it is plau-
sible to suppose that development and contribution of complex abilities 
to a social group is an important part of a good life. Unequal oppor-
tunity deprives them of this: instead they labor for the entrepreneur.9 
 7 This passage could be interpreted as being about unequal expectations among 
adults rather than about the prospects of children born into different classes. Still, 
the language here of a person’s ‘prospects’ is the same language he uses when 
writing about opportunity, and the phrases ‘start out’ and ‘initial inequality in life 
prospects’ suggest he is thinking about opportunity. In any event, this is the closest 
he comes to explaining why unequal opportunity might be thought to increase the 
opportunity of those with lesser opportunity, and I believe his explanation of why 
this is so — more material resources to the less advantaged — has to be the same 
in both the case of opportunity and the more general case of the expectations of the 
representative person of different classes.
 8 On positional goods see Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press 1976). To the extent that important goods are positional, 
what is important is relative position (ranking), not how well off one is in a more 
objective sense. On the problems that positionality makes for prioritarian concep-
tions of justice see Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, ‘Equality, Priority, and Posi-
tional Goods,’ Ethics 113 (2006) 471-97.
 9 The interpretation developed here of how Rawls imagines the social division of 
labor — between, on the one hand, those who organize and design the productive 
process or who do highly trained technical or intellectual labor and, on the other, 
those who labor in production doing simpler, less skilled labor — leans heavily 
on this example of how the difference principle is to be understood. This may be 
unfair to Rawls, but I am not sure. There are other elements in Rawls’s egalitarian-
ism that emphasize the wide dispersal of property, including the ‘powers of offi ce’ 
attaching to ownership and workplace democracy; these elements suggest a much 
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Having more things does not address this good. Instead we may use 
possession of things to try to compensate for joyless work.
To develop this second point: in the United States — and surely else-
where — many children’s potential is not well developed; moreover, 
children cannot have confi dence that, as adults, they will have the 
opportunity to contribute abilities they develop, as a physician, musi-
cian, architect, or philosopher. Opportunities to contribute developed 
complex abilities are scarce. As a result, many children, in the United 
States especially disadvantaged black children, anticipate at best a life 
of routine labor. In Rawls’s words, they are ‘debarred from experiencing 
the realization of self that comes from a skillful and devoted exercise of 
social duties’ (Theory 73). Rawls makes this observation in explaining 
why positions must be open to talents. But Rawls’s conception of fair 
equality of opportunity seems open to a similar objection: social class 
of origin affects a child’s prospects of being able to achieve self-realiza-
tion by performing social duties requiring great skill; many have little 
chance of attaining this important good. These considerations give us 
reason to seek a conception of equal opportunity where class position 
does not affect the likelihood of being able to develop and contribute 
our abilities.
II  Why Rawls Rejects Truly Equal Opportunity
Let us defi ne truly equal opportunity as opportunity where a child’s 
life prospects are unaffected by class of origin. Could limits on inequal-
ity implied by the difference principle combine with aggressive poli-
cies insuring educational equality to create equal prospects for children 
from all economic, social, and cultural backgrounds? Here I argue that, 
given his understanding of a just society, Rawls rightly rejects equal 
prospects.
1. Class position and motivation
Rawls believed that children from less advantaged families had lesser 
life prospects because they were likely to be less motivated to develop 
their abilities. But why should this be true? Perhaps children from advan-
more egalitarian view that is not so focused on distributive benefi ts of the divi-
sion of labor. But, to my mind, they also threaten to void any application of the 
difference principle and make puzzling his belief that ‘profound inequalities’ are 
inevitable. I explore the apparent duality of Rawls’s egalitarianism briefl y in the 
appendix.
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taged families are surrounded by examples that effort is rewarded by 
success while less advantaged children do not see as much reward for 
effort. If class of origin did not affect life prospects, then neither would 
it affect confi dence and motivation to develop abilities. This reason for 
differences in motivation would be unacceptable to Rawls because here 
the ultimate reason for differences in motivation is differences in life 
prospects, apart from motivation.
There is another, less objectionable, reason to agree with Rawls that 
class of origin will affect children’s motivation to develop their abili-
ties. Children are likely to fi nd their parents particularly compelling role 
models. If some grow up in families of manual workers and others in 
families of intellectuals, are we to suppose that these models make no 
difference in whether the children are likely to succeed in competition for 
limited positions? A system of compensatory education might try to pro-
vide role models from outside the family, but these models might not be 
as compelling. Consider, for example, how affective ties to one’s parents 
might infl uence one’s sense of appropriate training and occupation.
The ‘role model’ argument endorses Rawls’s belief that family of ori-
gin infl uences motivation. It does so on the assumption of competition 
for limited positions of advantage. This assumption is implied in Raw-
ls’s belief that effi ciency requires inequality. Hence Rawls’s vision of a 
just society is one where economic incentives are offered to recruit peo-
ple with scarce native abilities to a few positions demanding exercise 
of highly developed skills (thus requiring them to educate their native 
abilities in order to develop those skills), but only enough incentive to 
benefi t all, including the least advantaged. On this assumption about 
how labor is organized a small difference, a more compelling role model, 
may make the difference between success and failure. Some competi-
tors for limited opportunity must become discouraged in the competi-
tion; if this did not happen, all losing competitors would continue to 
hold out hope that their aspirations would be realized, but when many 
people have frustrated ambitions, their frustration contributes to social 
instability.10 Societies with limited and hence competitive opportunity 
have social mechanisms that discourage competitors and adjust aspira-
tions to the quantity of opportunity.11 Differences in the compellingness 
10 See Seymour Martin Lipset and Richard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society 
(Berkeley: University of California Press 1959), 262.
11 There is a paradox here: limited opportunities are competitive because the number 
with high aspirations exceeds the number of available advantaged positions. But 
social stability requires that aspirations be adjusted to the available opportunities. 
But this adjustment reduces competition. Hence stability requires the reduction 
of competition. 
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of role models are part of a process whereby some become discouraged. 
In the absence of other deciding factors, role models may be decisive in 
adjusting aspirations.
2. Equal opportunity and the liberty principle
Could compensatory education cancel class advantages with ‘equally 
good education and chances of culture’ for all children? We should not 
underestimate the diffi culty. The difference principle alters the basis on 
which inequalities are justifi ed; in principle, the same problem arises 
for the democratic conception as arose for the liberal conception: eco-
nomic and cultural inequalities create unequal opportunity. Parents use 
their resources to convey cultural mastery to their children, through 
enriching experiences (taking trips to volcanic parks or to museums 
and cathedrals) or by taking time from work to spend with their chil-
dren; doing this is easier for those with more money. When one parent 
has a high income the other may become a full-time tutor, teaching the 
children to read at an early age, teaching them arithmetic and math-
ematics, exposing them to music and scientifi c culture. Given the time 
spent and affective ties between parents and their children, compen-
satory education is unlikely to match these advantages and to create 
‘equally good education and chances of culture’ for all children.
The arguments I have given could be defeated if parents with greater 
income and wealth could be prohibited from using that wealth to advan-
tage their children; accordingly, we might imagine a prohibition on pri-
vate schools, paid tutorial services, or monetary aid to children past a 
certain age. Could we also prohibit using greater economic resources 
to fi ll the home with educational materials? These proposals seem to 
violate liberty; that is, such interference with how one may spend one’s 
money seems so great an interference with liberty that it would deprive 
one of a ‘fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties.’ Certainly this 
would seem to be so if the state were to prohibit parents from working 
less in order to spend more time educating their children.
I conclude that compensatory education for children of the less 
advantaged would likely be insuffi cient to cancel income and wealth 
advantages unless we prohibited parents from bringing educational 
materials inside the home, using their resources to give their children 
enriched experiences, prolonging their educational opportunity, or 
even spending more time with them. These prohibitions would violate 
the liberty principle.
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3. Equal opportunity and the difference principle
Truly equal opportunity seems incompatible with the difference princi-
ple. Either those with greater income and wealth can convey advantages 
to their children or they cannot. Suppose they can (as I have argued). 
Then truly equal opportunity requires wealth equality; it voids applica-
tion of the difference principle.
Now suppose that those with greater income cannot convey advan-
tages to their children perhaps because (contrary to the argument of the 
last subsection) a public system of ‘affi rmative action’ cancels the effect 
of any signifi cant income and wealth inequalities. But why should one 
seek greater income and wealth? One central motivation as parents is to 
make the life prospects of our children as good as possible. Truly equal 
opportunity makes it impossible to give some children an edge over 
other children in the competition for advantage. This could be demoral-
izing to parents. For many, advantaging their children is central to their 
conception of the good.12 Disallowing the use of extra income to advan-
tage their children would make some people unwilling to train and 
contribute their abilities (assuming, with Rawls, that an extra incentive 
is needed for this). If social institutions make it impossible for parents 
to advantage their children, then it is not obvious how effective the 
‘differences’ enjoined by the difference principle will be in creating 
incentives. So truly equal opportunity could undermine the difference 
principle by defeating the incentives it enjoins.
Truly equal opportunity (life prospects unaffected by class of ori-
gin) seems incompatible with the liberty and difference principles. If 
signifi cant income and wealth differences, even ones narrower than 
at present, can be translated into advantages to children, then truly 
equal opportunity would require us to limit liberty. Or, if people can-
not advantage their children in the competition for advantage, truly 
equal opportunity seems incompatible with the difference principle. 
There are two problems. The difference principle allows inequalities as 
incentives to induce people to develop and contribute abilities in a way 
that creates distributive benefi ts for the least advantaged. Truly equal 
opportunity threatens both the inequalities and the incentives. Hence, 
given his understanding of a just society, Rawls is right to reject truly 
equal opportunity.
12 In The Failures of Integration: How Race and Class are Undermining the American Dream 
(New York: Public Affairs 2004), Sheryll Cashin argues that many parents spend 
great sums to live in neighborhoods whose schools advantage their children.
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III  The Difference Principle and Rawls’s 
 Dubious Sociology
However, that is not the end of the matter. Is it an injustice that, as the 
argument of the previous section implied, some children are socialized 
so as to limit competition for limited positions of advantage? It is not 
unjust if this socialization is just a process of people realizing that their 
native endowments do not suit them for highly complex labor. Then, as 
Rawls says, deep inequalities are inevitable. But is he right about this?
1. Sociological assumptions
Let me draw together two threads from the last section. A plausible rea-
son (acceptable to Rawls’s argument) why class of origin might affect 
motivation is that, given affective ties, parents are a particularly com-
pelling role model for children in developing their abilities and that, 
given the division of labor between very complex labor and routine 
relatively unskilled labor, children are likely to be differently moti-
vated to develop more complex intellectual abilities. Since opportunity 
is limited, a difference in the compellingness of role models might be 
important in discouraging some from developing complex intellec-
tual abilities. Relatedly, I argued that, when opportunity is competi-
tive, socialization requires that some competitors become discouraged 
and drop from the competition. Both points arise from the Rawlsian 
assumption that labor is divided into a few positions requiring highly 
trained abilities and many more positions that require less skill. Perhaps 
this division of labor blunts the development of intellectual potential in 
children. If the sociology on which Rawls bases the assumed division 
of labor is itself fl awed, then we have reason to seek another way of 
understanding social justice.
Rawls’s assumption that labor must be organized so that many do 
simple labor while a few others do more complex labor is rooted in 
his belief that the difference principle has an application, that some 
inequalities benefi t everyone. Discussing, in Restatement, whether all 
the basic liberties should be guaranteed their fair value, Rawls writes, 
‘If that guarantee means that income and wealth are to be distributed 
equally, it is irrational; it does not allow society to meet the require-
ments of social organization and effi ciency’ (151). These remarks recall 
the discussion of effi ciency, the difference principle, and perfect jus-
tice at Theory 68-9; there he writes that a perfectly just scheme is one 
where the expectations of the least advantaged group are as high as the 
expectations of the least advantaged group in any alternative scheme. 
When the difference principle is ‘fully satisfi ed’ (when perfect justice is 
achieved), it is ‘impossible to make any one representative man better 
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off without making another worse off.’ In that sense ‘a perfectly just 
scheme is also effi cient’ (69). At Restatement 151 he seems to be assum-
ing that, if wealth and income were equal, then we all would be worse 
off than the least advantaged would be if we allowed some inequality. 
Why? Because we would be debarred from using incentives that would 
motivate the more talented and raise the levels of income and wealth 
for all of us.
Hence the requirement of effi ciency seems to be the source of Rawls’s 
belief that deep inequalities are inevitable. Here I sketch the sociologi-
cal assumptions implicit in the belief that perfect justice requires pro-
found inequality. The fi rst two assumptions could together be called 
‘the meritocrat’s dream.’
1.  Rawls believes that effi ciency requires that social positions be 
organized so that some require scarce developed abilities while 
others require only more easily acquired abilities (for example, 
we need more construction workers than architects); that is, 
there is a division between complex and simple labor.13
2.  He assumes (I will argue) that the distribution of native poten-
tial at least roughly approximates the distribution of positions 
requiring greater or less training and highly developed skill in 
modern societies (as described in 1).
3.  He assumes that at least some people with relatively scarce 
developed abilities needed for effi cient production will con-
tribute their abilities only given an extra incentive — addi-
tional income, wealth, or power; this is the assumption that 
inequalities allowed by the difference principle really do ben-
efi t everyone.
In this section we will examine these assumptions (and I will refer 
to them often by their numbers). On the third assumption: With G.A. 
Cohen we may ask why people require an extra reward to contribute 
their abilities.14 Would an equal share of the common benefi t be insuf-
fi cient incentive? And (Cohen’s more specifi c question) could some-
13 See note 9 above and the appendix below for problems with attributing this 
assumption to Rawls.
14 If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press 2000), Chs. 8 and 9 as well as other essays cited there. These challenges are 
further developed in Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press 2008), which I have not yet read.
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one endorse the difference principle and still bargain for recompense 
greater than others’? Later I propose an idea nearly the opposite of the 
third assumption.
However, I will focus my discussion on the meritocrat’s dream. For 
reasons to be explained Rawls needs assumption 2, which is almost 
surely false. Moreover, 1 is a much more profound source of unequal 
opportunity than 3. So if 2 is false and the division of labor assumed in 
1 is unnecessary, we have reason to look at justice in a different way.
2. The meritocrat’s dream
Suppose an effi cient society divides social positions into those requir-
ing greater and lesser complex knowledge and skill; giving all children 
fully nurturing environments, some develop ability to fulfi ll duties of 
positions requiring greater complexity, and others never do.15 In those 
equally and fully nurturing environments, the number of people who 
develop complex abilities is roughly equal to the number of positions 
needing complex abilities. Thus the structure of positions of an effi cient 
society mirrors the abilities people develop in these nurturing environ-
ments. The society is effi cient because it matches positions to people’s 
native endowments and their development; social organization opti-
mizes production so that all benefi t. This is the meritocrat’s dream. Is 
it true?16
Surely it is widely believed that there is a ‘natural lottery’ of ability, 
but what is meant by ‘ability’? Talk of abilities is well defi ned when 
it concerns specifi c abilities and disabilities, such as color vision and 
defi cits in it or 20/20 vision and myopia. We can investigate whether 
20/20 vision is affected by environmental or genetic variations. There 
may well be a natural lottery infl uencing who is myopic.
Although it may be widely believed that people are naturally suited 
to what they do, that they have natural gifts for philosophy, mathemat-
ics, or basketball, the belief may be neither well-grounded nor even 
meaningful. Talk of natural abilities often simply redescribes observed 
differences in what we can do as ‘natural’: some do philosophy very 
15 I believe that this asks us to imagine what is socially impossible, that with equal 
opportunity everyone would be socialized for positions that only a few would 
attain.
16 The meritocrat’s dream seems based on the functional theory of stratifi cation, 
which was in the air when Rawls started graduate school. For discussion and ref-
erences see my How to Make Opportunity Equal: Race and Contributive Justice (Mal-
den, MA: Blackwell Publishing 2007), Ch. 9.
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well; others have great musical ability; this must be because some have 
a natural talent for philosophy, others for music.17 I doubt that it is mean-
ingful to speak globally of ‘ability.’ IQ psychology can give content to 
the idea of global ability but cannot rescue that idea. The IQ test is not a 
measuring instrument comparable to an ammeter or a mass spectrome-
ter, embedded within relatively uncontroversial theory. It has a dubious 
history of connection to theories of class and racial inferiority.18
It would be remarkable if there were a lottery of human potential cor-
responding to the organization of social positions into a few requiring 
mastery of very complex abilities and most requiring more rudimentary 
skills. For tens of thousands of years, perhaps over a hundred thousand, 
anatomically and culturally modern humans fl ourished and spread 
over the earth in societies with limited division of labor, primarily by 
age and gender. Judging from recent peoples who have lived in groups 
with rudimentary division of labor, we may infer that social, cultural, 
and subsistence activities required exercise of complex thought and 
detailed knowledge of one’s environment.19 It takes great social skill 
to maintain harmony, to cooperate, and to resolve differences absent 
a state that centralizes force.20 Mastery of complex abilities is spread 
widely among group members. Modern humans evolved in such egali-
tarian groups. Less than ten thousand years ago, class structure arises, 
divisions between rulers and ruled, some planning production and 
others carrying out labor tasks under instruction and supervision.21 
17 For criticism of these ideas see How to Make Opportunity Equal, Chapter 10, where I 
argue that the ‘because’ here is not an explanation.
18 Leon Kamin, The Science and Politics of IQ (Potomac, MD: Lawrence Erlbaum Asso-
ciates 1974), especially Chapter 1 and my How to Make Opportunity Equal, Chapter 
10. On related issues see Brian Barry, Why Social Justice Matters (Cambridge: Polity 
Press 2005), Chapters 8 and 9; there is much else.
19 On nomadic foragers there is much; see, for example, Richard Lee, The Kung San: 
Men, Women, and Work in a Foraging Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1979); the essays in Eleanor Leacock and Richard Lee, eds., Politics and His-
tory in Band Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982); Colin Turn-
bull, The Forest People: A Study of the Pygmies of the Congo (New York: Touchstone 
1961); Jean L. Briggs, Never in Anger: Portrait of an Eskimo Family (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press 1970).
20 On the hypothesis that the intelligence of modern humans arises to master social 
complexity and negotiate a complex social terrain see Robin Dunbar, Grooming, 
Gossip, and the Evolution of Language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
1996).
21 On the rise of state-level societies and some of the differences it makes for social 
organization see Jonathan Haas, The Evolution of the Prehistoric State (New York: 
Columbia University Press 1982); Morton Fried, The Evolution of Political Society: 
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Labor under close supervision becomes routine, even mindless. (Adam 
Smith notes the negative effect of such labor on the worker’s mind and 
contrasts the dullness of laborers with the intelligence of people liv-
ing in ‘barbarous societies.’)22 Specialists develop writing, record keep-
ing, and systematic knowledge of the heavens. Children from different 
social classes are socialized for different adult positions. Of course, it 
was widely believed, as Aristotle evidences, that some were born to 
rule and others to serve. But it would be remarkable if it were true, 
given the evolution of human society. If we interpret Rawls’s belief in a 
lottery of ‘native endowments’ as an approximation of the meritocrat’s 
dream, then it is a contemporary version of Aristotle’s belief, and it is 
almost surely false.
Not even Rawls believes fully in the meritocrat’s dream. In both Theory 
and Restatement Rawls considers the objection that differences required 
as incentives will create large economic inequalities. In Restatement he 
replies that ‘given the basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity, 
the open competition between the greater numbers of the well-trained 
and better educated’ will prevent great income inequalities (67; cf. The-
ory 136-7, 270). This reply seems to assume that the number of people 
trained and educated will exceed the number of positions requiring 
such training and education.
By how much? If the number trained and capable greatly exceeds the 
number of positions requiring such training, if most normal people can 
fi ll those positions, then the society with only a few positions of advan-
tage is irrational or unjust. Capable physicians work as phlebotomists 
because only a few physicians are needed even though many more are 
capable of being physicians and, with equal opportunity, have so trained 
themselves. This is irrational. Or, if most children have the potential 
to be physicians or managers but only a few are needed, then society 
might train only a very few more than are needed. But if this is the case, 
then the resulting society blunts the development of children’s intel-
ligence so that their developed abilities match what they will do. It is 
unjust to discourage children from developing abilities. To avoid these 
objections Rawls could assume that the number with greater ‘native 
ability’ only slightly exceeds the number of positions requiring it. I have 
An Essay in Political Anthropology (New York: McGraw-Hill 1967); Allan Johnson 
and Timothy Earle, The Evolution of Human Societies: From Foraging Group to Agrar-
ian State (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1987; and my ‘How Morality Works 
and Why It Fails: On Political Philosophy and Moral Consensus,’ The Journal of 
Social Philosophy 28 (1997) 43-70.
22 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 1976), Volume 2, 302-5 (Book V, Chapter I, Part III, Article II).
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no idea why anyone would believe this. We should regard assumption 
2 as implausible at best (at worst, the idea of ability is undefi ned).
If Rawls’s conception of equal opportunity is to make sense, he needs 
the assumptions comprising the meritocrat’s dream. If, as is likely, 
potential to master complexity is nearly universal in human popula-
tions, then it is unjust to bring children up in such a way as to blunt 
their development of that potential. If we reject 2, Rawls’s view of 
equal opportunity is implausible. Social organization should not make 
it impossible for many children to develop and, as adults, to contribute 
complex abilities.
3. Effects of the division of labor on equal opportunity: 
Rawls’s assumption 1
If there is no natural lottery suiting people for positions created by the 
division of simple from complex labor, what are we to say about that 
division itself? This division is incompatible with truly equal oppor-
tunity for a quite general reason suggested earlier. Because children 
are socialized to the positions they hold as adults (the socialization 
principle), then some children will be socialized for routine labor and 
a much smaller number for positions requiring more developed abili-
ties.23 These differences in socialization are familiar from all class societ-
ies. It may work through parental socialization where differences in the 
cultural attainments of parents — attainments reinforced in day-to-day 
work life — are conveyed to children as competitive advantages and 
disadvantages. Or it may work in other ways. But those who grow up 
with fewer advantages will — for that reason alone — do more simple 
routine labor, and this is unfair. If we seek to develop abilities in all 
children, we must abolish this division of labor.
IV  Contributive Justice as an Alternative 
 to Rawlsian Opportunity
A lot rests on whether there is a natural lottery corresponding to the 
assumed division of labor. If, as I think plausible, the potential to mas-
ter complexity is widespread in human populations, then socialization 
for routine labor requires blunting the development of human abilities 
in many children. This is unjust. This injustice has been acknowledged 
23 See How to Make Opportunity Equal, Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the 
socialization principle.
Dilemmas of Rawlsian Opportunity 19
when it was specifi cally racial — when black children were targeted for 
‘vocational education.’ We now need to recognize the injustice more 
broadly. Justice to children requires that they be encouraged to develop 
their potential.
My belief that it is unjust to inhibit children’s development of their 
abilities is grounded in the following thoughts: where social structures 
unnecessarily impede or prohibit people from leading a good life, the 
society in question is defective; where they impede some to the advan-
tage of others, when this is unnecessary, the society is unjust. Then to 
sustain the claim that Rawls’s imagined well-ordered society is unjust 
(because it impedes the development of ability in children from some 
social classes) I need to show how something better is possible.
My suggestion is that labor be shared, specifi cally whatever routine, 
relatively mindless labor is necessary to provide us with goods and 
services; all must do it. This sharing would eliminate the differences, 
grounded in the socialization principle, in the ways children are social-
ized, some for lives of simple labor, others for lives of complex labor. 
Because no one’s life would be consumed by simple labor, sharing labor 
would provide everyone with opportunity to develop complex abilities, 
to contribute those abilities to society, and to earn esteem for contri-
butions of complex labor, provided that complex labor too is shared 
among all who demonstrate the relevant mastery. The development 
and contribution of our abilities and the earning of esteem for contribu-
tions are human goods.24 A just society should make available to all the 
opportunity to attain these goods. A conception of contributive justice 
articulates the central norms that would make these goods available to 
all simultaneously and non-competitively.25
In the section on the idea of a social union Rawls defends one divi-
sion of labor. While his discussion is rather abstract, what he has in 
mind, I think, is that it is inevitable that we will not develop all of our 
potential to master complexity: I had the potential, let us suppose, to be 
an architect, a surgeon, a musician, a lawyer, and a philosopher. But it 
is impossible to be all of these. So I contribute as a philosopher, while I 
enjoy listening to the music of others and benefi t from others’ surgical 
abilities, architectural achievements, and so forth. Thus the develop-
ment of our abilities is complementary (Theory 464). I agree with Rawls 
that the complementary development of different complex abilities in 
different people is inevitable in a modern society.
24 On this point see How to Make Opportunity Equal, Chapter 6.
25 See How to Make Opportunity Equal, Chapter 13.
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What is not necessary is that some are socialized for routine, simple, 
unskilled labor, while others are encouraged to develop more complex 
mastery and have the opportunity to contribute that mastery and earn 
esteem for that contribution. Comparing the two types of labor leads to 
contempt for the contributions of those whose labor is simpler. If every-
one does a share of routine labor, it ceases to be a ground for social con-
tempt. Moreover, while it cannot be guaranteed that everyone will win 
esteem for contribution of complex mastery (some may fail to master 
any complex ability or may refuse to contribute their complex mastery 
to the group), the social barriers to everyone’s winning esteem simulta-
neously for their contributions will have been removed. Moreover, for 
reasons that Rawls’s discussion of complementary labor makes clear 
and because larger communities of people sharing an ability enhances 
everyone’s ability (as in a larger community of good philosophers each 
makes others better), we have reason to encourage others in their devel-
opment and contribution of their abilities.26
I argued earlier that, for the most part, Rawls believes that the impor-
tant opportunities are for goods that are received. Rawls is concerned 
with distributive justice more than justice as it concerns our labor. One 
exception is the passage at Theory 73, which implies that ‘a skillful and 
devoted exercise of social duties’ is an important good for which we 
ought to have opportunity. Contributive justice is built around that 
idea. We are then rejecting the difference principle: more skilled and 
challenging positions do not require an extra extrinsic incentive because 
they are already intrinsically more desirable. Developing and contribut-
ing those abilities is a good that, other things being equal, most prefer 
to routine labor. Our conception of justice is contributive rather than dis-
tributive. That is, the most important goods are our contributions to a 
social group. Justice makes contributive goods available to all simul-
taneously. Unlike material goods that are distributed, contributive 
opportunities might be of unlimited supply if we share labor so that all 
children can develop their abilities to the fullest and, as adults, contrib-
ute developed abilities to society. This is a very different conception of 
justice from Rawls’s, but it is a conception of justice that would allow 
truly equal opportunity.27
26 See How to Make Opportunity Equal, Chapter 8 for further explanation of how shar-
ing labor makes it possible to have nurturing rather than competitive relations 
with others.
27 But see the appendix for a discussion of whether Rawlsian justice could accom-
modate contributive justice.
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V  Conclusion
Rawls believed that the effect that class of origin inevitably had on chil-
dren’s life prospects was compatible with ‘fair equality of opportunity.’ 
I have shown how Rawls’s conception of equal opportunity is embed-
ded in his sociology. We cannot achieve truly equal opportunity within 
the framework of his sociological assumptions. So Rawls was right, 
given his sociology, to conceive of equal opportunity as he did.
Nevertheless, many of us — or at least I — fi nd unsatisfactory a con-
ception of justice that allows that children from disadvantaged groups 
are less likely to develop abilities and, as adults, contribute these to soci-
ety. Among other things, this represents too weak a rejection of racial 
disadvantage as a special case of class disadvantage. We should seek a 
conception of justice that allows all children to develop and contribute 
whatever abilities they may be capable of developing. But given the 
socialization principle — that children will be socialized for available 
opportunities and, where desirable opportunities are limited, many 
will be socialized for inferior options — we would need to reject the 
organization of labor that leads to limited opportunity. Instead of think-
ing of the important opportunities as ones to receive material goods 
(thus Rawls’s conception of effi ciency as effi ciency in the production of 
commodities), we should regard the most important opportunities as 
opportunities to contribute our abilities to society. If these opportunities 
are unlimited, then the socialization principle would allow that a just 
society could develop the abilities of all children. Contributive oppor-
tunities could be unlimited if all labor — both routine and complex 
— is shared among all with the relevant abilities. The central norms of a 
contributive conception of justice would ensure that these contributive 
opportunities are available to all equally.
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APPENDIX: 
ARE THERE TWO EGALITARIANISMS IN RAWLS?
This appendix is essentially a long footnote addressing what seem to be 
two irreconcilable egalitarian views in Rawls’s thought. The question 
mark in the title is because I do not see how to resolve these apparent 
confl icts. Perhaps others can.
The present paper is a critique of what I will call the dominant strain 
in Rawls’s egalitarianism. In that strain there are inevitably ‘profound 
inequalities’ in people’s life prospects; the inequalities arise from the 
demands of effi ciency (which lead to the difference principle); effi ciency 
requires a division of labor between more and less skilled positions 
and differences in material rewards to the more demanding positions 
requiring extensive training of scarce native potential. These profound 
inequalities in both material resources (Rawls’s apparent emphasis) 
and in the esteem earned by social contributions (emphasized in the 
present paper) are grounded in the effects of the natural and social lot-
teries, as well as luck and other contingencies, and the requirements 
of effi ciency. The inequalities are serious enough that the less advan-
taged are inclined to envy the more advantaged, a problem which 
Rawls addresses in §§80 and 81 of Theory.28 The resulting inequalities 
are just because they increase production and hence the goods available 
to those least advantaged. The emphasis here is on distributive justice 
and maximizing the distributive share of the least well off group.
There is another strain in Rawls’s egalitarianism. In that secondary 
strain contribution is a central good, and we fi nd self-realization through 
skilled performance of social duties. A property owning democracy 
leads to a wide dispersal of property and of the powers entailed by 
ownership. There is workplace democracy.29 The ‘worst aspects’ of the 
28 The problems created by inequality even within a Rawlsian well ordered society 
are quite serious; Rawls imagines they are lessened by the fact that less advan-
taged and more advantaged form non-comparing social groups so that (my exam-
ples) janitors compare their material resources and social esteem with janitors and 
cabdrivers while architects compare themselves with architects and engineers. He 
seems to fi nd the inequalities between the groups severe enough that these sepa-
rate associations are helpful in diminishing ‘the number of occasions when the less 
favored are likely to experience their situation as impoverished and humiliating.’ 
I fi nd this appalling; one of his proposed solutions — separation into non-compar-
ing groups — seems to represent a recognition that, on his view of justice, there is 
no common basis for social esteem that allows all to be esteemed.
29 Samuel Freeman’s Rawls (London: Routledge 2007), 113 emphasizes these and 
generally develops the secondary strain into an interpretation of Rawls. I do not 
understand how Freeman takes account of the dominant strain. 
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division of labor are overcome; ‘no one need be servilely dependent on 
others and made to choose between monotonous and routine occupa-
tions which are deadening to human thought and sensibility. Each can 
be offered a variety of tasks so that the different elements of his nature 
fi nd a suitable expression.’ ‘[W]ork is meaningful for all’ (Theory 464). 
(This is followed by a discussion of how labor specialization is comple-
mentary, as discussed earlier.) Throughout this section (§79 The Idea of 
Social Union) I fi nd no hint of inequality or of benefi ciaries and losers 
in the natural lottery. Rather we bring different (not unequal) abilities to 
one another and cooperate on that basis.
A natural lottery of ability also seems absent at Theory §47 at 268-69 
where he considers a ‘perfectly competitive economy surrounded by 
a just basic structure.’ Under these circumstances ‘the relative attrac-
tiveness of different jobs will be equal, all things considered.’ Jobs that 
would be otherwise less desirable will be better paid. But note that in 
the situation Rawls imagines, inequalities in life prospects created by 
the basic structure have disappeared. Moreover, the difference principle 
is not doing any work since there are no social or economic inequali-
ties.30
Here I note these two strains but do not reconcile them. Perhaps they 
cannot be reconciled; in work as groundbreaking as Rawls’s it should 
not be surprising that there should be unresolved problems or that the 
view could be developed in contradictory ways — particularly if Rawls 
was unclear in his own sociological assumptions.
Could Rawlsian thought be developed to include what I have called 
contributive justice? The social bases of self-respect could be thought to 
include the esteem we earn for our social contributions. Because com-
plex labor earns more esteem, the difference principle might require 
that the labor be organized so as to maximize the opportunities of the 
least advantaged group to contribute complex abilities. This would 
lead, within a Rawlsian framework, to breaking down the division 
between simple and complex labor.
The previous paragraph puts the argument of this paper in Rawl-
sian language. But Rawls never developed his thought in this way 
and it seems incompatible with how he imagines the application of 
the difference principle. Moreover, his conception of justice addresses 
30 My attention to this passage was drawn by Richard Krouse and Michael McPher-
son’s ‘Capitalism, ‘‘Property-Owning Democracy,’’ and the Welfare State’ in Amy 
Gutmann, ed., Democracy and the Welfare State (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press 1988). Rawls cites this essay favorably in Restatement at 135 n.2 and repeats 
some of its argument (without citing it) in the preface to the revised edition of 
Theory at xiv-xvi.
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primary goods that are in scarce supply (the circumstances of justice) 
while sharing labor would make unlimited the opportunity to develop 
and contribute our abilities. Equally important, Rawls is committed to 
market mechanisms and to property owning democracy, and — I have 
argued this elsewhere — market norms are not compatible with con-
tributive justice.31
In Rawls’s thought there are two rival views of the good. The domi-
nant view is Kantian: we have higher order interests in the develop-
ment of our two moral powers (a sense of justice and a conception of the 
good) and in advancing the conception of the good we have formed.32 
Effi ciency requires inequality in order to maximize the income and 
wealth available to the least advantaged to advance their conception 
of the good. The result is deep inequalities. The other view of the good 
is Aristotelian with a Marxist infl uence. The good is human activity, 
and the best societies are ones that enable universal fl ourishing through 
self-realizing activity, particularly social labor. Through cooperative 
labor that develops the abilities of each, each person earns esteem from 
self and others. This second view of the good is the ground of contribu-
tive justice, but I cannot reconcile it with the dominant strain in Rawls’s 
thought.33
31 How to Make Opportunity Equal Chapters 12 and 13.
32 Explained in ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,’ in Collected Papers, espe-
cially 312-13.
33 My thinking about these issues was originally infl uenced by conversations with 
Anthony Laden and Daniel Brudney. Early drafts of this paper were a chapter of 
the manuscript that became How to Make Opportunity Equal, but the chapter was 
excised from the fi nal version of the book to make the book more accessible to a 
wider audience. The chapter drafts were criticized by Laden and G.A. Cohen, and 
this led to a great improvement. A section of the paper was the topic of an APA 
colloquium where it received some criticism from Charles Mills. Mahesh Ananth 
read a draft and offered encouragement in pursuing the argument. I received 
searching criticism of a draft from an editor and two referees for CJP; these led to 
a substantial rewrite and, I think, major improvement. Finally David Copp and 
Laden reassured me that the appendix was not insane. I thank all of you.
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